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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OP UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960029-CA 
V. : 
FRANKLIN BUTLER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from nonjury convictions of aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302 (1995); and aggravated kidnapping, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly admit testimony concerning 
statements made by a coconspirator as non-hearsay under rule 
801(d)(2)(E), Utah Rules of Evidence? 
Although the admissibility of evidence is a question of 
law subject to the "correctness" standard of review, when the 
court's legal analysis is contingent upon the resolution of a 
predicate factual issue, the "correctness" standard of review 
necessarily incorporates a "clearly erroneous" standard for 
review of the subsidiary factual determination. State v. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). In order to resolve 
the question of whether the challenged testimony was admissible 
as nonhearsay, the trial court was required to determine whether 
the defendant and the coconspirator participated in a criminal 
joint venture, a subsidiary factual determination reviewed under 
the highly deferential "clearly erroneous" standard. See State 
v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1318 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on 
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302 (1995); and aggravated kidnapping, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995) (R. 1-
2). Defendant waived a jury trial, and the case was tried to the 
bench on July 27, 1995 (R. 13, 21-22). The judge found defendant 
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guilty as charged, and, on September 6, 1995, sentenced him to 
serve two concurrent terms of five-years-to-life in the Utah 
State Prison (R. 28-29, 30-31). Defendant appeals, challenging 
the trial court's admission of evidence under rule 801, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT Q? FACTS 
At 1:00 a.m. on Sunday, May 14, 1995, Audrey Jenkins, 
her friend Lydia, and Audrey's boyfriend Etie Kabwasa, were 
sitting on the floor in an upstairs room of Audrey's Ogden 
apartment talking (R. 60-65, 105). Suddenly, James wBo" Robinson 
burst into the room, followed by defendant, Franklin Butler (R. 
63, 105-06). Bo brandished a knife and demanded money from Etie 
(R. 72, 106) . Etie repeatedly denied having any money, prompting 
Bo to say, *I know you have got some money, that's why we came 
over here because I knew you had some money" (R. 73, 76), and nI 
know you do because somebody saw you down at the [American] 
Legion and said you were spending money" (R. 72). Defendant 
added, "if you don't give [us] the money, we are going to teach 
you a lesson" (R. 106-07). Etie continued to claim he had no 
money, but neither defendant nor Bo believed him (R. 73, 75-76, 
106-07). 
3 
Lydia asked defendant if she could leave because she 
had left several children in her apartment next door (R. 73, 
107). Defendant let Lydia leave, but refused to let Audrey leave 
(R. 74-75, 107)• Bo then started the first of three beatings 
Etie would receive that morning, while defendant watched and kept 
Audrey in the room (R. 75-76, 107). Finally, Etie confessed that 
there was money in his jacket and begged them to let Audrey go 
downstairs to get it (R. 76, 108). When Audrey returned, she gave 
the jacket to defendant, who searched through the pockets, but 
found no money (R, 76-77, 109-110). Etie broke down and gave 
defendant all the money he had in his pocket, but it was not 
enough, and the beating continued (R. 109, 111-12). 
Bo continued hitting Etie, periodically brandishing the 
knife (R. 77, 107-08, 110-11). When defendant began to move away 
from the door, Audrey bolted from the room and went to Lydia's 
apartment where her children were staying (R. 77, 110). 
Defendant did not follow her, but instead joined Bo in beating up 
Etie (R. 77, 110). 
Eventually, Bo made his way to Lydia's apartment, 
followed by defendant and Etie (R. 77-78, 98, 111). The demands 
for money continued, and Etie insisted that he had none (R. 78). 
Bo told Etie, *I am not leaving until you give me moneyt,]" and 
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ultimately told him, "well, you had better find a way to get it.* 
(R. 78-79). Etie finally decided that he might be able to borrow 
some money if he could make a phone call (R. 78, 99, 112). 
Neither Lydia nor Audrey had a phone, so the call had to be made 
from a pay phone (R. 100). 
Bo agreed to the call, and he, defendant and Etie left 
the apartment (R. 79, 113). Once outside, the second beating 
began (R. 79, 113). Defendant and Bo pinned Etie against a car 
and beat him, then defendant hit him across the ribs with a board 
(R. 80, 114). Audrey's screams stopped the beating (R. 114), and 
the group headed for defendant's car, with Bo forcing Audrey to 
go along (R. 80). When Audrey suggested a place with a phone, 
defendant, who was driving, snapped, WI am going to take you 
right the fuck where I want to go" and drove them to a location 
of his choosing (R. 81). 
Once at the phone, defendant and Audrey disagreed on 
who would make the call. Defendant insisted that Audrey make the 
call, while Audrey insisted that only Etie could get money from 
his friend, Harry (R. 81-83). Audrey helped Etie from the car 
because he was dizzy, unsteady, and bleeding from the mouth (R. 
82)• Defendant supplied the money for the phone call, but when 
Etie started to dial, defendant grabbed the receiver from him, 
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saying, "you ain't dialing shit, let her dial it" and *[y]ou 
could be calling anybody." (R. 82-83, 115). Audrey ultimately 
spoke with Harry, begging him to help Etie or "they" would kill 
him (R. 84, 100, 116, 144). 
In the meantime, Etie had started back towards the car 
(R. 84). Defendant and Bo started beating him for the third time 
(R. 84-85, 115). Etie was on the ground when defendant picked up 
a post, "drew back" and hit Etie once "hard" on the left side of 
his upper body, knocking Etie unconscious (R. 84-86, 115-16). 
Defendant grabbed Etie, pulled him to his feet, and started 
punching him again (R. 115-16). At one point, defendant told Bo, 
"man[,] we should have shot him anyway, get him over with [sic]." 
(R. 116). 
By the time Audrey finished the phone call, all three 
men were back in defendant's car (R. 86). She explained to them 
that Harry would help, but they would have to go to Layton 
because Harry would not come to Ogden (R. 86). Although 
defendant complained about being a taxi, he drove everyone to 
Layton in his car (R. 86-87). 
When they arrived at Harry's apartment, Audrey got out 
to meet Harry, and Bo followed her (R. 88-89). Harry gave Audrey 
all his money--$35.00--and, when she said it would not be enough, 
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a sapphire-ruby ring he believed to be worth more than $400.00 
(R. 88, 144-45, 149). Audrey gave the money and the ring to Bo, 
who cussed, nThis is nothing. This is not worth $500.00. I 
don't want this shit." (R. 89). Frank pulled his car from the 
parking lot closer to where Bo stood, Bo got in, and the two men 
took off, leaving Audrey and Etie behind (R. 89, 146). Both 
Harry and Marie, the woman who picked defendant up after the 
assault, testified that Etie "was a mess" (R. 140-41, 146). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGT7MFNT 
Defendant's claim that the State's alleged failure to 
establish the existence of a criminal conspiracy rendered certain 
evidence inadmissible has no basis in the law of this 
jurisdiction. The law is clear that in order to admit statements 
made by a coconspirator in a trial pursuant to rule 801(d)(2)(E), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, the State need not establish criminal 
conspiracy as charged in Utah Code Ann. 76-4-20 (1995). State v. 
Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1318. Instead, the State must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a criminal joint enterprise 
existed, and that both defendant and the coconspirator were 
involved, id. Because the evidence clearly establishes these 
points, as well as the fact that the statements were made in 
furtherance of a criminal venture, the trial court properly 
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admitted the testimony, and defendant's claim on appeal must 
fail. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE STATEMENTS OF A 
COCONSPIRATOR AS NONHEARSAY UNDER RULE 801(D)(2)(E), UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, WHERE THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED, 
BEYOND A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, THAT DEFENDANT AND 
HIS CODEFENDANT WERE INVOLVED IN A CRIMINAL VENTURE AND THAT 
THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE IN FURTHERANCE OF THAT VENTURE 
During the direct examination of its first witness at 
trial, the prosecution sought to elicit testimony concerning 
statements made by James *Bo" Robinson during the course of the 
robbery and kidnapping (R. 66). Addendum A. Defendant objected, 
arguing that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay and that the 
State was unable to make the prerequisite showing of a criminal 
conspiracy (R. 67-71). Addendum A. The trial court recessed to 
enable counsel to obtain legal authority, heard argument from 
both sides, then permitted the admission of the testimony 
provisioned on the prosecutor's ability to establish the 
requisite points in the course of the trial (R. 70-71). Addendum 
A. 
After the parties rested, the court revisited the 
issue, ultimately finding the evidence admissible (R. 22, 155). 
8 
Addendum B. After quoting from State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 
1986)/ the court stated: 
In this case, I believe that the State has 
established certainly by a preponderance of the 
evidence the involvement of this defendant in the 
criminal venture. And therefore I admitted 
provisionally the statements of the co-conspirator. 
And I am now ruling that those statements are 
admissible as co-conspirators in the commission of this 
crime [sic]. And I think the State's argument is well 
taken that it is obvious when you have an aiding and 
abetting situation that you -- the example he used the 
bank robbery, someone waiting outside as a driver. The 
Court cannot imagine that the statement of the other 
participants [#']turn over the money, ["] or ["Jhold your 
hands up turn over the money,["] wouldn't be 
admissible. Therefore, I think that I am persuaded 
these statements are admissible and should come in in 
this case. 
(R. 155). Addendum B. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
allowing, as an exception to the hearsay rule, the testimony 
concerning Bo's statements. Br. of App. at 6-10. Specifically, 
he argues that, as a prerequisite to admission of the hearsay 
under rule 801(d)(2)(E), Utah Rules of Evidence, the State must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a 
criminal conspiracy as it is outlined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-20 
(1995), which provides the elements for the crime of conspiracy. 
Br. of App. at 7. However, defendant's argument misinterprets 
the law. 
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Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not 
hearsay if: 
• • • 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is 
offered against a party and is (A) the party's own 
statement, in either an individual or a representative 
capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has 
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a 
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a 
statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by 
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within 
the scope of the agency or employment, made during the 
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a 
coconspirator of a party during the course and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. 
In State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986), upon which 
defendant relies, the Utah Supreme Court expressly stated that, 
"although proof of criminal conspiracy [under section 76-4-20] 
may be sufficient to support introduction of testimony pursuant 
to the [hearsay] exception, it is not necessary for application 
of Rule 801(d)(2)(E).* Id. at 1318. The court not only 
acknowledged that there were differences in the proof required to 
convict a person of criminal conspiracy and the proof required to 
admit evidence pursuant to rule 801(d)(2)(E), but was careful to 
explain the difference, id. at 1317-19. 
Under Gray, statements by a coconspirator may be 
admitted as nonhearsay under rule 801(d)(2)(E) upon proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence, independent and exclusive of the 
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proposed statement(s), that (1) a criminal joint venture existed 
in which (2) defendant participated and (3) the coconspirator was 
a member. Gray. 717 P.2d at 1318-19. Such evidence may be 
offered either before or after the coconspirator's statement is 
admitted, id. at 1319. The trial court may consider, among 
other things, defendant's own statements suggesting his 
involvement in the conspiracy or joint venture, as well as 
actions by either the defendant or the coconspirator, id. 
Finally, the challenged statement(s) must have been made during 
the course of, or in furtherance of, the criminal venture. Utah 
R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). 
Defendant's summary of the evidence does not do justice 
to the testimony the trial court obviously believed. Br. of App. 
at 8. Further, he states that the victim testified that 
defendant was unarmed and made no threats or requests for money. 
Id. at 9-10. To the contrary, the victim testified that the 
defendant twice used a board to beat him, knocking him 
unconscious the second time (R. 114-15); "took a clip of the gun 
behind a chair and put [it] in" (R. 130); told the victim nif you 
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don't give [us] the money, we are going to teach you a lesson" 
(R. 106-07); and demanded money (R. 106) .x 
The evidence in this case readily establishes the 
existence of a criminal joint venture and the direct involvement 
in the joint venture of both defendant and James "Bo* Robinson. 
Defendant and Bo were friends who showed up at Audrey's house 
together, remained together throughout the ordeal, and left 
together immediately after obtaining the money and the ring, 
stranding Etie and Audrey in Layton. Both defendant and Bo 
demanded money from Etie as soon as they arrived, then used force 
throughout the remainder of the ordeal to obtain it. Nothing in 
the evidence suggests any other reason for defendant and Bo to be 
present except to further their demand for money. Shortly after 
arriving at Audrey's, Frank told Etie, "if you don't give [us] 
the money, we are going to teach you a lesson", following which 
the first of three severe beatings began (R. 106-07). 
Both defendant and Bo participated in beating Etie in 
Audrey's apartment, in front of Lydia's apartment, and at the pay 
'Defendant's brief also suggests that the kidnapping charge 
related to Audrey. Br. of App. at 9 (defendant "was not even 
present when the alleged kidnapping of Audrey took place"). The 
State never alleged or argued that defendant kidnapped Audrey. 
The kidnapping charge related solely to Etie, and it was on that 
basis the trial court found him guilty (R. 2, 161). 
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phone. While Bo was the one who wielded the knife and took the 
money from Harry, defendant was present throughout the ordeal, 
took the money Etie had on him, acted in support of Bo's demands, 
and never tried to help the victim or otherwise separate himself 
from Bo's actions and statements. When he was not actively 
hitting Etie with his fists or with boards, he was present while 
Bo delivered the beating. He facilitated the first beating by 
actively detaining Audrey while Bo beat up Etie. He took the 
change Etie had on him as well as looked through the jacket 
pockets for money he thought would be there. 
The pair apparently arrived in defendant's car and used 
it to leave once they had gotten Harry's money and ring. 
Defendant not only used his car during the ordeal to get to a 
phone and ultimately to get the money, but drove it himself, 
verbally declaring that he was in charge of where they went by 
saying, "I am going to take you right the fuck where I want to 
go[,]" ignoring Audrey's suggested location and driving to one of 
his own choosing. He provided the money for the phone call and 
dictated who would speak on the phone. 
An objective view of this evidence, independent of any 
of Bo's statements, makes it more probable than not that 
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defendant and Bo were involved in a criminal venture for purposes 
of rule 801(d)(2)(E). fiEax, 717 P.2d at 1320. 
Where the criminal joint venture or "conspiracy" is 
established, it becomes clear that the coconspirator's 
statements--all dealing with getting money from the victim and 
making the phone call to get money from his friend--were made in 
furtherance of the "conspiracy*, as required by rule 
801(d)(2)(E). Defendant and his companion made their appearance 
demanding money from Etie, and left only after they had gotten 
some. Everything in between was aimed at reaching that goal. 
Bo's statements--including "Etie, I want your money[,]" "Give me 
your money[,]" I know you [have money] because somebody saw you 
down at the Legion and said you were spending money[,]" "I know 
you have got some money, that's why we came over here because I 
knew you had some moneyt,]" "what are you going to do, because I 
am not leaving until you give me moneyt, ]" "well, you had better 
find a way to get it [the money]"--further that criminal goal. 
Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that the State 
had met its burden, "certainly by a preponderance of the 
evidence!,]" of establishing the prerequisites for admission of 
the challenged testimony as nonhearsay under rule 801(d)(2)(E). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reason, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's convictions and 
sentences. 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
The State does not believe that oral argument would be 
beneficial in this case or that a published opinion is warranted 
where resolution of the issue will not materially add to existing 
case law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *2> day of April, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
<&?*ta^f 
C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed by first class mail, 
postage prepaid, to Kent E. Snider, Weber County Public 
Defender's Association, attorney for appellant, 2568 Washington 
Blvd., Suite 203, Ogden, Utah 84401, this <?=)' day of April, 
1996. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Trial Transcript (R. 66-71) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q The three of you? 
A Yes, all three of us were up in the room sitting 
down. 
Q And vas the apartment locked or unlocked downstairs?! 
A The apartment door didn't have a lock on it because 
about a month prior to that it vas kicked in. And housing hadj 
never fixed the door, because the door vas on order because it] 
is a wooden door covered with a steel plate. So it had to be 
special ordered. And the door hadn't been replaced yet. 
Q So just by pushing on it the door opened, is that 
correct? 
A Correct. 
Q All right. Were these gentlemen here by invitation? 
Did you expect either of them? 
A No, I did not expect them at that time. No, I 
didn't. 
Q All right. And so you look up and you see James 
Robinson is where you left off I believe, is that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q And you refer to him as Bo, is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. And what vas his appearance and his 
demeanor? 
A His demeanor vas that he meant vhat he said. 
Q Okay. What had he said? 
21 
066 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. GRAVIS: Objection, hearsay. 
MR. DAROCZI: Well, your Honor, this is--
MR. GRAVIS: Statement by a co-defendant. He is not} 
on trial. Mr. Butler is on trial. Anything Mr. Robinson 
5
 || says is hearsay. It is not admissible. It is not admissible 
against Mr. Butler. 
MR. DAROCZI: Your Honor, the Rule 801 of the 
evidence code specifically address that, statement by co-
conspirator. And I am offering it under that section. 
MR. GRAVIS: Mr. Butler is not charged with 
conspiracy. I agree that statements by a co-conspirators are 
admissible to prove the conspiracy. He is not charged with 
conspiracy. There is no charge of conspiracy here. And it is) 
only admissible to prove the conspiracy. In fact the case law] 
also holds that if the Court dismisses the charge of 
conspiracy in a case with other charges pending, the Court is 
then to instruct the Jury to disregard the hearsay testimony 
of the co-defendant as inadmissible. 
MR. DAROCZI: As a matter of fact, your Honor, the 
cases in the—the three cases that are referred to in the 
footnotes to rule 801 refer to three cases where the 
conspirator's statements, similar statements were admitted. 
In none of the three cases had conspiracy been charged. But 
the Court allowed the statements by co-conspirators. They 
were drug cases. Two of them were drug cases wherein the co-
22 
0C7 
to 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
defendant's statement had been admitted as a co-conspirator*s 
statement under the rule* And neither is there authority for 
the position that counsel takes that a conspiracy in fact has 
to be charged for co-conspirator's statements to come in. As 
a matter of fact, I have authority to the effect that it does 
not have to be charged. 
7
 MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I haven't researched it for] 
8
 I quite sometime, but Mr. Daroczi and I tried a conspiracy case 
four or five years ago where the conspiracy was dismissed at 
the end of the prosecution case and requested that specific 
instruction. So I know there is a case, Utah case lav on that] 
issue. 
THE COURT: Either of you consider briefing this 
before you came in? 
MR. GRAVIS: I had no—he never filed a motion for-H 
in limine to allow this. And it is hearsay. And it is my 
position that it is inadmissible. 
MR. DAROCZI: Your Honor, counsel has been lying in 
wait here. He has had the reports, and he knows exactly what 
the State's case is about. 
THE COURT: Well, without the attack back and forth, 
I don't have a brief from either one of you. Hold on just a 
minute, I will take a look at this rule. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, may I make one further 
statement? I had filed a Motion to Sever based upon the 
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 Bruton decision, a statements made by the co-defendant being 
2
 admissible, not admissible against my client. So Mr. Daroczi 
3
 I was on notice that I intended to— 
4 
THE COURT: The footnote to the rule makes reference! 
to State vs. Gray. It says to utilize the co-conspirator 
exception the State must introduce evidence independent and 
exclusive of the conspirator's hearsay statements themselves 
8
 I and establish by a preponderance of the evidence the existence) 
of a criminal joint venture and the Defendant's participation 
therein. Independent evidence of the Defendant's membership 
in the criminal venture is almost required. I don't believe l| 
have that at this point. 
MR. DAROCZI: If the Court will take this testimony 
subject to that, we certainly~our position is that— 
THE COURT: I am not very comfortable in doing that. 
I am the trier of the fact here. I am going to sustain the 
objection at this point 
MR. DAROCZI: Your Honor, we cannot proceed then 
further unless the Court takes it. I have authority to the 
effect that the Court can consider that statement and then 
analyze it, take the testimony subject to that requirement. 
Because otherwise the Court cannot hear the facts of this 
case. The statements—most of the statements are made by Bo 
Robinson. Most of the threats. As a matter of fact, most of 
the violence is committed by Bo Robinson against the victim. 
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And our secondary position is that the Defendant is 
secondarily aiding and abetting, aiding and abetting in a 
crime. So by virtue of that, if the Court excludes the 
statements, the evidence will not—the trier of the facts 
cannot hear a full story. 
THE COURT: X think what we should do, let me ask a 
question. And let's note for the record here that there is 
another matter that the Court has had pending this morning. 
Is the D'Hulst matter ready to go forward? 
What we are going to do is take a recess in the criminal 
action. Counsel, I expect you to go during the recess and 
pull up your case authority. We will spend a few minutes in 
my Chambers determining where we are. 
You may step down, ma'am. If you will stay close, you 
will be subject to being recalled back to the stand. Okay? 
The criminal matter is in recess. We will go to the case] 
of D'Hulst vs. D'Hulst at this time. 
(Butler case recessed.) 
THE COURT: Let our record show that we are back in 
session. The parties are present with counsel. When we last 
broke, the Court broke to handle another matter that was 
pending. And that's been taken care of. But the Court also 
asked counsel to look into this question that was on the 
record previously that had to do with whether this testimony 
of statements made by Mr. Robinson would be admissible in this 
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case. 
And at this point the Court is going to allow the 
statements in. And they will be allowed in provisionally, 
subject to the State meeting the test for the admissibility of] 
those statements. And that will be determined by the Court 
after the testimony is received. 
MR. DAROCZX: If I may add one thing. The State is 
also offering it as non-hearsay. As non-hearsay in that it is] 
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein, but 
as an independent--as statements having independent 
significance. So with that we are ready to proceed. 
MR. GRAVIS: And we are objecting on both grounds. 
We agree the Court can provisionally hear the testimony of a 
co-conspirator. But if the conspiracy is not proven, the 
statements would be disregarded. 
As far as the other argument the State has made, he just 
brought that up in Chambers, I have not had time to research 
it. But we are objecting that the statements would still be 
hearsay. 
THE COURT: All right. We have noted those 
objections. Go ahead with your questions. 
Ma'am, you understand you are still under oath? 
A Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q Audrey, you were telling us that Bo, James Robinson, 
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referring to where there is no overt act. 
THE COURT: Z thought he agreed there was an overt 
act. 
MR. GRAVIS: I say there is not an issue there is an1 
overt act. 
THE COURT: The Court is going to make its ruling irj 
this case. 
I believe the case of State vs. Gray, 717 P.2nd 1313 is 
applicable here. Quoting some of the language of that case, 
the court in that case, the Supreme Court, stated we 
acknowledge the diversion of authority on the subject and hold 
today in accordance with the prevailing view that the criminal] 
venture and defendant's participation therein must be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence. When applying! 
the standard to determine whether to admit a co-conspirator's 
hearsay statements, the court may consider the accused's own 
statements indicating his involvement in the conspiracy, as 
well as actions by the accused or the declarant. 
Further, although a conspirator's statements may be 
provisionally admitted subject to independent proof of the 
criminal venture and the defendant's participation therein, 
the Court should make an on the record finding of admission of] 
it before the case is submitted to the Jury. 
In this case, I believe that the State has established 
certainly by a preponderance of the evidence the involvement 
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of this defendant in the criminal venture. And therefore I 
admitted provisionally the statements of the co-conspirator. 
And I am now ruling that those statements are admissible as 
co-conspirators in the commission of this crime. And I think 
the State's argument is well taken that it is obvious when yod 
have an aiding and abetting situation that you—the example hej 
used the bank robbery, someone waiting outside as a driver. 
The Court cannot imagine that the statement of the other 
participants turn over the money, or hold your hands up turn 
over the money, wouldn't be admissible. Therefore, I think 
that I am persuaded these statements are admissible and should] 
come in in this case. 
So that's my ruling, and the evidence is allowed. 
Now, as to the question of the ultimate guilt or 
innocence of the Defendant, do you want to speak to that? 
MR. DAROCZI: We will submit it, your Honor. I 
might reply if counsel wishes to make an argument. 
MR. GRAVIS: I will be very brief, your honor. You 
have heard all the evidence. I submit that the case rests on 
the credibility of the witnesses. The Court has heard the 
testimony. It is clear that Mr. Kabwasa's statement to 
Detective Lucas has significantly changed, particularly after 
he heard Audrey Jenkins testify. He gave a statement to start) 
with he was downstairs in the kitchen drinking coffee. Now hej 
says we were upstairs in the bedroom. 
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